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A PROPOSAL TO EXPAND THE RELIGIOUS SERVICES EXEMPTION
UNDER THE COPYRIGHT ACT
Kevin M. Lemley*
The Copyright Act, like its 1909 predecessor, contains a number of ex-
emptions that permit certain types of use without first obtaining permission
from the copyright owner or proving fair use.' This article will focus on the
exemption for religious services.2 No court has yet interpreted this exemp-
tion, and scholars have given it a similar level of review. As such, an analy-
sis of this exemption's constitutionality and adequacy to fulfill its intent in
the twenty-first century is an issue that has largely gone unaddressed by
both the judiciary and academic communities.
The principal argument is that the religious services exemption is con-
stitutional and should be expanded to cover: (1) any work used in the course
of services; and (2) the recording, broadcast, and transmission of the ser-
vices. As set forth below, the present state of the Copyright Act and fair use
doctrine serve as a regulation that burdens the exercise of religion. The ex-
pansion proposed in this article is a reasonable accommodation to religion
that is needed to lift this regulation. Consequently, the expansion does not
run afoul of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.3 Alternative-
ly, should the proposed expansion be deemed in violation of the Establish-
ment Clause, the proposed expansion could be further expanded to cover
other teaching and philosophical concerns.
Part I analyzes the existing religious services exemption under the
Copyright Act to delineate the bounds of which uses fall under the exemp-
tion. Part II presents a proposal for expanding the exemption to accommo-
date the needs of modem religious organizations. Part 11 addresses the Es-
tablishment Clause and the constitutionality of the current religious services
exemption. Additionally, Part III will demonstrate that the religious services
exemption can be saved from an Establishment Clause challenge by expand-
ing the exemption to cover other non-religious ventures, such as teaching in
general. Part IV discusses traditional fair use under copyright law, particu-
* Kevin Lemley is counsel at Mitchell, Williams, Selig, Gates & Woodyard and
teaches Intellectual Property at the University of Arkansas at Little Rock William H. Bowen
School of Law. I would like to thank Judson Taylor, Mona Wedad, and Cassie Howell for
their helpful assistance in preparing this article. All my love to my sweet little redhead, Syd-
ney Lemley.
1. 17 U.S.C. § 110 (2006).
2. 17 U.S.C. § 110(3).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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larly how the fair use analysis will apply to works used during the course of
religious services.
I. THE CURRENT RELIGIOUS SERVICES EXEMPTION AND PROPOSAL FOR
EXPANSION
Copyright vests in the owner the exclusive rights to reproduction, dis-
tribution, preparation of derivative works, performance, and display.4 Any-
one that violates these rights is subject to a claim for copyright infringe-
ment.5 An infringement claim can be avoided if the use qualifies as a fair
use,6 the owner grants a license for the use,7 or if the use falls under a statu-
tory exemption.8 This article addresses the religious services exemption,
which exempts certain uses of certain works during religious services.9
The religious services exemption was not a new addition to the current
Copyright Act of 1976; this exemption stems from Section 104 of the 1909
Act.10 In its entirety, the exemption states that "performance of a nondra-
matic literary or musical work or of a dramatico-musical work of a religious
nature, or display of a work, in the course of services at a place of worship
or other religious assembly" is not copyright infringement." Legislative
history regarding the exemption is sparse, for the House Report explaining
this exemption contains only three brief paragraphs. 2 The following subsec-
tions will deconstruct the existing religious services exemption to highlight
both the types of uses covered by the exemption and the types of uses that
fall outside the exemption.
A. Applicable Works Under the Religious Services Exemption
Of the five rights that comprise copyright, the religious services ex-
emption only applies to certain performance and display rights.13 Any type
of reproduction, distribution or derivative work is presently outside the ex-
4. 17 U.S.C. § 106. Moral rights are also afforded to authors of certain works. See 17
U.S.C. § 106A.
5. 17 U.S.C. § 501.
6. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
7. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d).
8. 17 U.S.C. § 110. Other exemptions do exist, but this article is concerned with the
religious services exemption provided in 17 U.S.C. § 110(3).
9. 17 U.S.C. § 110(3).
10. 4 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 14:36 (West 2011).
11. 17 U.S.C. § 110(3).
12. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 84-85, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5698-99.
13. 17 U.S.C. § 110(3).
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emption. 4 Rather than provide categorical protection, the exemption carves
out limited exercise of a limited amount of rights.
The performance rights provided for in the exemption refer to certain
nondramatic and dramatic works. However, neither the current 1976 Act nor
the prior 1909 Act provide a definition of "dramatic."' 5 From case law ex-
amining the nature of dramatic works, it can be stated that dramatic works
tell a story through dialogue and action, rather than narrating or describing
the action.' 6 As an illustration, movies and plays are dramatic works, where-
as novels and poetry are nondramatic works. 7 Additionally, the phrase "of a
religious nature" modifies only dramatico-musical work, not nondramatic
literary or musical works.' 8 The House Report provides insight for the re-
striction on dramatico-musical works, stating the intent was "to exempt cer-
tain performances of sacred music that might be regarded as 'dramatic' in
nature, such as oratorios, cantatas, musical settings of the mass, choral ser-
vices, and the like."'19
The religious services exemption also applies to the display of all kinds
of works.2" This display right, unlike the performance right, has no concern
with whether a work is dramatic or nondramatic. 2' Any work may be freely
displayed during the religious service. For example, the exemption would
extend to display of any sculpture, photograph, painting, map, or other type
of work subject to the display right.
This prong of the religious services exemption is quite limited in scope,
and many types of uses by religious organizations are not covered under the
exemption. Secular movies or plays, which comprise a great deal of modern
pop culture, are not covered at all under the exemption. As discussed in
Section III, religious organizations can often communicate their messages
more effectively using secular works rather than religious works. Even for
covered works, the religious organization's use can quickly exceed the
bounds of the exemption. For example, it is very common today for reli-
gious organizations to project the lyrics to songs on large screens during
services. While the exemption covers the performance of the song, it does
not extend to display of the lyrics on a screen. In fact, any derivate work of a
covered work will exceed the permissible bounds of the exemption.
14. Id.
15. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.06[A] (Mat-
thew Bender 2011).
16. Id.
17. Copyright Glossary, WASHBURN UNIVERSITY, http://www.washbum.edu/copyright/
glossary/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2012).
18. 17 U.S.C. § 110(3); 2 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 15, § 8.15[D][1].
19. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 84-85, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5698-99.
20. 17 U.S.C. § 110(3); H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 84-85, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5698-99 ("[I]n addition, it extends to displays of works of all kinds.").
21. 17 U.S.C. § 110(3).
20121
UALR LAW REVIEW
B. Temporal and Geographical Limitations of the Religious Services
Exemption
The temporal and geographical limitations of the exemption signifi-
cantly limit the exemption's applicability. The exemption only applies to
performances or displays that occur "in the course of services at a place of
worship or other religious assembly. '22 The temporal limitation of "in the
course of services" precludes the exemption from other events that occur at
the place of worship, such as social, educational, fund raising, or entertain-
ment purposes.23 Use of a qualifying work would be exempted during the
formal services but not exempted for, say, a spaghetti supper fundraiser for
youth mission trips. For many places of worship, a large part of their activi-
ties would fall under these other purposes rather than formal services.
It is important to note there is presently no case law defining the scope
of "in the course of services." A narrow interpretation would restrict this
definition to a handful of regularly scheduled services. A broad interpreta-
tion would extend this definition to other functions of the religious organiza-
tion. For example, weddings often involve readings from religious texts and
a brief discussion from a religious leader. Under a broad interpretation, the
wedding would qualify as a service under the exemption, as would other
meetings of particular groups, such as a men's Bible study or a youth group
ministry. The narrow interpretation more closely fits Congressional intent,
and this article proposes the following definition: any regularly scheduled
meeting of a religious organization, that is open to all members of the reli-
gious organization, where the primary purpose of the meeting is to worship
or to discuss the beliefs of the religious organization through words or mu-
sic.
Whether this or a similar definition is ever adopted by the courts, what
is important now is to realize that religious organizations often have numer-
ous activities at the place of worship that are not religious services. The ex-
emption will not cover any use of copyrighted works at these activities that
fall outside the accepted definition of religious services. This yields the situ-
ation where use of the same work will be exempt during the religious ser-
vice but not exempt during other activities, such as weddings or picnics.
Regarding the geographical limitation, the phrase "at a place of wor-
ship or other religious assembly" was written to include places such as audi-
toriums, outdoor theatres, and the like.24 As such, the exemption is not lim-
ited to a particular type of building. Limiting the exemption to a particular
22. 17 U.S.C. § 110(3).
23. Id.; H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 84-85, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5698-99.
24. 17 U.S.C. § 110(3); H.R. REp. No. 94-1476, at 84-85, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5698-99.
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type of building would have been ineffectively restraining. Some religions
meet at members' private homes rather than having a fixed place of wor-
ship.2 5 A disaster that damages the normal place of worship could cause the
congregation to temporarily meet at a new location, such as a school cafete-
ria.26 Both the private home and the cafeteria would qualify as a place of
worship for purposes of the exemption.
C. Recording, Broadcasting, and Transmitting Copyrighted Works
Congress clearly intended for the exemption to not extend to broadcasts
and other transmissions. The phrase "at a place of worship or other religious
assembly" was written so that "the exemption would not extend to religious
broadcasts or other transmissions to the public at large, even where the
transmissions were sent from the place of worship. '27 Additionally, the reli-
gious services exemption does not grant any type of protection to recordings
of religious services, even those that are not later disseminated. While use
of a qualifying work is exempted during the service, the exemption will not
extend to a recording, broadcast, or transmission of the service.
The analysis above shows that the religious services exemption affords
some practical benefits to religious organizations. In the same vein, the ex-
emption is limited and does not extend to uses that are essential for religious
organizations in the digital age. The next section will present a proposal for
expanding the religious services exemption in hopes of overcoming the
shortfalls in the present exemption.
II. PROPOSAL TO EXPAND THE RELIGIOUS SERVICES EXEMPTION
There can be no dispute we live in a much different world than when
the religious services exemption took effect in 1976. Advancements in tech-
nology and communication have altered the ways in which people com-
municate and expect others to communicate. Also prevalent is a changing
society heavily influenced by pop culture-one where Rutgers University
25. Even religions that typically have a fixed place of worship are experiencing a growth
in home-based churches. House Church Central is an organization dedicated to the growing
house church movement for Christianity. See HOUSE CHURCH CENTRAL,
http://www.hccentral.coml (last visited Mar. 22, 2012).
26. This illustration is based upon my personal experience in the mid-1990s when a fire
caused our church to meet for a time at a local school cafeteria. Another example would be
the aftermath of a natural disaster, such as the recent tornado that ravaged Joplin, Missouri on
May 22, 2011.
27. 17 U.S.C. § 110(3); H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 84-85, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5698-99; see also Simpleville Music v. Mizell, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1298
(M.D. Ala. 2006).
28. 17 U.S.C. § 110(3).
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pays television reality star Snooki more money to appear on campus than it
does for Nobel and Pulitzer Prize winning author Toni Morrison to deliver
the commencement address.29 These technological and societal forces have
changed the ways in which religious organizations need to communicate
their religious messages. The religious services exemption should be ex-
panded to accommodate the needs of religious organizations in the digital
age.
A. Expand the Exemption Substantively to Encompass all Uses of all
Works
The exemption should be expanded to cover all uses, including deriva-
tive works, of all types of works used during religious services. The need for
this expansion is caused by a shift in how the public seeks spirituality.
Americans are tuming to sources of popular culture, rather than religious
organizations, for discussions about spirituality and supreme beings.3" This
development cannot be described as surprising. Given the present state of
our culture, popular media communicates to Americans much more effec-
tively than traditional worship services provided by religious organiza-
tions.31 As a result, religious organizations have been forced to move away
from a service consisting of preaching and a few songs to a "'multisensory
approach comprised of many dimensions and expressions of worship."'
32
Religious organizations have responded to the modem American culture by
adapting their worship services-in case you had not noticed, worship ser-
vices today are much different from the services conducted in the 1990s.
Contemporary services now employ new elements including musical in-
struments, Internet broadcasts, video clips, and live performances.33 Modem
worship services now typically include videos, music, and the digital display
of art.34 Video editing and production is quite common as the cost has now
29. Gus Lubin, State University Rutgers Paid Snooki $32,000 for a Speech About Party-
ing and Tanning, BUSINESS INSIDER (April 4, 2011), http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-
04-04/news/29965833_1_snooki-budget-gap-commencement-address.
30. Brian D. Wassom, Unforced Rhythms of Grace: Freeing Houses of Worship from
the Specter of Copyright Infringement Liability, 16 FOROHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 61, 106-10 (2005).
31. Id. at 112-22.
32. Id. at 133. This movement also extends to communication outside the service. By
way of example, consider how Creative Church Culture ("C3") markets its speakers for its
annual conference. See Speakers, C3 CONFERENCE (2011), http://www.c3conference.com
/201 l/speakers.php (last visited Mar. 22, 2012). For every speaker, C3 only provides elec-
tronic communication information such as Twitter, Facebook, websites and blogs; there are
no phone numbers or physical addresses for speakers.
33. Wassom, supra note 30, at 130-31.
34. Id. at 134.
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been drastically reduced. 35 "'From beginning to end [in many cotemporary
houses of worship], the whole service is a popular culture event, or specta-
cle, with secular music, TV and film clips, slice-of-life dramatic skits, and
visual art.' '
36
The most notable aspect of this digital shift in worship services is that
religious organizations are no longer limited to use of sacred or religious
works. In fact, the use of secular works can have a much greater impact for
religious services because secular works often represent our environment
more accurately than sacred works.37 Moreover, the religious organization
can use the congregation's existing connection with the secular work as a
springboard for theological discord.38 By way of example, religious organi-
zations have incorporated in their services scenes from the movies APOLLO
13 and THE LORD OF THE RINGS: THE Two TOWERS, as well as numerous
others. 39 The organization's message can be especially powerful when a
derivative work is made, such as projecting images of a movie while the
congregation sings a song.'
For religious organizations to communicate effectively and promote
their religious purposes in the digital age, they must make use of copyright-
ed works. This need extends to the use of both secular works and religious
works. Expanding the religious services exemption to cover all uses of all
works will accommodate the modem needs of religious organizations.
B. Recordings, Broadcasts, and Transmissions of Religious Services
The exemption should be expanded to include recordings, broadcasts,
and other transmissions of religious services. When the exemption was cre-
ated in 1976, our capabilities were limited to record, broadcast, or transmit
events like religious services. Today the opposite is true as the Internet and a
plethora of readily available electronic devices easily facilitate the instant
recording, broadcasting, and transmitting of events like religious services. It
is quite the understatement to say that we now live in a society steeped in
technology where every form of expression is accessible instantly and elec-
tronically.41 Along with cell phones, computers, and the Internet, "Google,
35. Id.
36. Id. at 136 (citing ROBB REDMAN, THE GREAT WORSHIP AWAKENING: SINGING A NEW
SONG IN THE POSTMODERN CHURCH 163 (2002)).
37. Wassom, supra note 30, at 124-25.
38. Id. at 153.
39. Id. at 153-55.
40. Id. at 151-52.
41. Id. at 103-04.
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Facebook, and Twitter, have become ubiquitous in today's culture. 42 Pro-
fessor Werbach describes these technologies, along with YouTube and
Skype, as "the emerging infrastructure of communication and community
for a changing society. 43
If any doubt persists as to the impact of these technologies, consider
this example from California. Over a fifty-three hour period during July 15-
17, 2011, the city of Los Angeles shut down a ten mile stretch of the 405
Freeway.' This closure was expected to affect 500,000 vehicles, and author-
ities dubbed the expected turmoil as "carmageddon. 45 To give proper notice
of the closure, the Los Angeles Police Department asked Lady Gaga, Kim
Kardashian, Ashton Kutcher, and Demi Moore to tweet about the closure.46
These celebrities were selected because they have a combined Twitter fol-
lowing of more than 30 million people.47 Officer Karen Rayner of the LAPD
said, "'We're utilizing TV and radio, but not everyone uses those mediums
so we're reaching out through social media contacts.'
' 48
Online social media and related technologies have progressed to a point
that we have fostered a culture where people are never out of reach. 49 At
present, what is the longest amount of time you can go without receiving a
text, email, or social media message? How about using the Internet? Do you
spend more time on your cell phone actually talking or using electronic
communication tools? Because our modem culture consists of a wealth of
digital media that encompass our daily lives, religious organizations must be
able to employ these media when communicating. ° In fact, people today
"find it only natural to expect this type of communication from their houses
of worship."5' Not only do people expect communication through digital
media, the religious organization's message is easily lost without use of
digital media. We live in an era where we are bombarded with hundreds, if
not thousands, of digital communications every day. Not only have we
grown to expect ongoing, instant access to communications, we have come
to rely upon this type of access in regards to information retention. Religious
42. Timothy J. Fallon, Mistrial in 140 Characters or Less? How the Internet and Social
Networking Are Undermining the American Jury System and What Can be Done to Fix it, 38
HOFSTRA L. REv. 935, 937 (2010).
43. Kevin Werbach, Off the Hook, 95 CORNELL L. REv. 535, 538-39 (2010).
44. LAPD Asks Lady Gaga, Kim Kardashian to Tweet About 405 Closure, HUFFINGTON
POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/30/lady-gaga-traffic-reporter_n_887850.html
(last updated Aug. 30, 2011).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Wassom, supra note 30, at 149.
50. Id. at 105-06.
51. Id. at 134.
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organizations can no longer rely on weekly meetings to effectively com-
municate; they must compete amid this sea of digital communication that
offers instant access to information. Religious organizations have felt social
pressure to communicate to their members through the popular media of the
day. For some time, religious organizations have had an inherent need to
broadcast services. 2 Along with television and radio, that inherent need of
broadcast has extended to the Internet. Many religious organizations now
broadcast their services on the Internet.53 The FCC recently decided that
religious organizations are not automatically exempt from providing closed-
captioning in their broadcasts. 4
Expanding the exemption to allow for recording, broadcast, and other
transmission will allow religious organizations to effectively communicate
in the digital era. It should be emphasized that religious organizations have
broadcasted their services over radio and television for several decades and
over the Internet for a decade or so. There are no cases where religious or-
ganizations have been sued for copyright infringement over these broad-
casts. This is strong evidence that copyright owners either do not object to
these broadcasts 55 or that social norms would not permit infringement ac-
tions for these broadcasts.
C. Social Norms Favor Expansion of the Religious Services Exemption
Social norms, which alter the practical scope of copyright,5 6 favor ex-
pansion of the exemption. While no cases exist where a religious organiza-
52. 2 W. COLE DURHAM AND ROBERT SMITH, RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW §
19:1 (2011); see also Loretta Fulton, First Baptist Church Enters Digital Age, ABILENE
REPORTER NEWS (Feb. 1, 2009, 8:48 AM), http:/lwww.reportemews.com/news/20091feb/0l/
first-baptist-church-enters-the-digital-age/ (stating the local First Baptist Church has broad-
cast its services on local television since 1971).
53. Fulton, supra note 52. A company called StreamingChurch.tv provides services
exclusively to religious organizations to broadcast their religious services on the Internet. See
STREAMINGCHURCH.TV www.streamingchurch.tv (last visited Mar. 22, 2011).
54. Brendan Giusti, FCC: Religious Broadcasts Now Need Closed-Captioning,
CHRISTIAN POST REPORTER (Nov. 1, 2011, 5:53 PM), http://www.christianpost.connews/fcc-
religious-broadcasts-now-need-closed-captioning-60002/.
55. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Cities Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 443-47 (1984).
56. Michael Grynberg, Property is a Two-Way Street: Personal Copyright Use and
Implied Authorization, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 435, 446-48 (2010); see generally Steven
Hetcher, Using Social Norms to Regulate Fan Fiction and Remix Culture, 157 U. PA. L. REv.
1869 (2009), Jacqueline D. Lipton, Copyright's Twilight Zone: Digital Copyright Lessons
from the Vampire Blogosphere, 70 MD. L. REV. 1 (2010); Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-
Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1525 (2004). In fact, enforcing
copyrights through infringement actions may create a backlash that inadvertently strengthens
social norms against copyrights. Ben Depoorter, Alain Van Hiel, & Sven Vanneste, Copy-
right Backlash, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1251, 1289 (2011).
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tion was sued for copyright infringement for use that was restricted to the
religious service, one example does exist where the National Football
League (NFL) threatened to sue churches for copyright infringement.57 This
campaign ended with disastrous results for the NFL. It is no secret that reli-
gious organizations across the United States hold Super Bowl parties. These
parties typically include food, drink, and projection of the game on a large
screen or wall. The NFL threatened religious organizations with litigation if
they held these Super Bowl parties without paying royalties at the cable
rate.58 Although the NFL was technically correct in its interpretation of the
Copyright Act, the NFL's actions sparked an intense public outcry.59 The
public frustration was fueled in part by the NFL's selective enforcement
policy that permitted Super Bowl parties at bars, restaurants, and other
sports viewing establishments.' The NFL caved under this pressure from
the public, including members of Congress, and the NFL now allows reli-
gious organizations to host Super Bowl parties without paying royalties.6
The classic case of social norms and copyright involved the American
Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP). In 1995, ASCAP
demanded royalties from the Girl Scouts of America for all performances,
including when the girls sang campfire songs.62 Anti-ASCAP advertise-
ments appeared in newspapers, and television news programs showed girl
scouts dancing a silent Macarena without any accompanying music for fear
of a lawsuit.63 The public backlash was so intense that ASCAP's public rela-
tions consultant described it as "p.r. hell."64 ASCAP refunded all royalties
paid and ceased any further enforcement attempts against Girl Scouts of
America.65
Both the NFL and ASCAP were technically correct in their arguments
under the black letter law of the Copyright Act, but social norms simply
would not allow infringement claims against religious organizations and the
57. Michael Foust, NFL: Sports Bars In, Churches Out, BAPTIST PRESS, (Feb. 1, 2007),
http://www.bpnews.netlbpnews.asp?ID=24878.
58. See Steven D. Jamar, Religious Use of Copyrighted Works After Smith, RFRA, and
Eldred, 32 CARDOZO L. REv. 1879, 1900 (2011); Tyler McCormick Love, Throwing the Flag
on Copyright Warnings: How Professional Sports Organizations Systematically Overstate
Copyright Protection, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 369, 378-79 (2008); Foust, supra note 57.
59. Jamar, supra note 58, at 1900; Foust, supra note 57.
60. Love, supra n. 58, at 378; Foust, supra note 57.
61. Jamar, supra note 58, at 1900.
62. Id. at 1901; Elisabeth Bumiller, Battle Hymns Around Campfires; Ascap Asks Royal-
ties from Girl Scouts, and Regrets It, N.Y. TIMES,(Dec. 17, 1996), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/12/17/nyregion/ascap-asks-royalties-from-girl-scouts-and-
regrets-it.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
63. Bumiller, supra note 62.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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Girl Scouts.66 Similar social norms exist for the expansion of the religious
services exemption, which this article proposes. Religious organizations are
using copyrighted works during religious services beyond those allowed in
the exemption.67 Additionally, religious organizations are broadcasting and
otherwise transmitting their services, which include use of copyrighted
works.68 The public demands these types of uses by religious organizations,
and any attempt to file copyright infringement lawsuits for these types of
uses would be met with the same negative results experienced by the NFL
and ASCAP. Ironically, Christian Copyright Licensing International (CCLI)
and other Christian organizations have been most vocal in threatening in-
fringement litigation against religious organizations, but they have not gone
so far as to file copyright infringement lawsuits.69
The expansion of the religious services exemption proposed in this ar-
ticle is necessary to allow religious organizations to effectively communi-
cate their religious messages in the digital age. This expansion would be
embraced by social norms, which are unlikely to permit infringement ac-
tions against religious organizations for communications made during reli-
gious services. Now the analysis must turn to whether the religious services
exemption can survive an Establishment Clause challenge.
III. THE RELIGIOUS SERVICES EXEMPTION DOES NOT VIOLATE THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE SIMPLY BECAUSE IT BENEFITS RELIGIOUS
ORGANIZATIONS
Professor Cotter has twice expressed concern that the religious services
exemption may violate the Establishment Clause,70 basing this conclusion
primarily upon the Supreme Court's decisions in Corporation of the Presid-
ing Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos7' and
Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock.12 A close examination of these cases gener-
66. Id.
67. Wassom, supra note 30, at 79-89.
68. Id. at 130-34.
69. Id., supra note 30, at 181-82. This is not a new development, for owners holding the
copyright to music of a religious nature have a history of enforcing rights against religious
organizations. See F.E.L. Publ'ns, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 754 F.2d 216 (7th Cir.
1985); Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962). To date, I am not aware of any in-
fringement cases filed against religious organizations for uses made during religious services.
70. Thomas F. Cotter, Accommodating the Unauthorized Use of Copyrighted Works for
Religious Purposes Under the Fair Use Doctrine and Copyright Act § 110(3), 22 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 43, 60-65 (2004)[hereinafter Accommodating]; Thomas F. Cotter, Guten-
berg's Legacy: Copyright, Censorship, and Religious Pluralism, 91 CAL. L. REv. 323, 388-
91 (2003) [hereinafter Gutenberg's Legacy].
71. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
72. 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
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ates the opposite conclusion, and it is important to consider that Professor
Cotter's work assumed the scenario of a religious organization making a
general use of copyrighted works. This article considers religious organiza-
tions making use of copyrighted works that is restricted to religious services.
Any Establishment Clause analysis must begin with the three-factor
test set forth in Lemon v. Kertzman.7 3 Regarding the applicable policy when
interpreting the Establishment Clause, the Lemon Court stated that "we must
draw lines with reference to the three main evils against which the Estab-
lishment Clause was intended to afford protection: 'sponsorship, financial
support, and active .involvement of the sovereign in religious activity."' 74
From there, the Court set forth the classic Lemon test: (1) "the statute must
have a secular legislative purpose;" (2) "its principal or primary effect must
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;" and (3) "the statute must
not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.' ' '75 This test
established a framework for numerous laws to pass constitutional muster
even though they accommodate religious purposes: "'This Court has long
recognized that the government may (and sometimes must) accommodate
religious practices and that it may do so without violating the Establishment
Clause."' 76 Since Lemon, the most recent Supreme Court cases addressing
the Establishment Clause have drawn a clear distinction between a liability
exemption and an exemption from paying taxes.
A. Exemptions From Liability Are Less Likely to Violate the Establish-
ment Clause Than Exemptions From Payment of Taxes
In Amos, the Court used a systematic application of the Lemon factors.
This case involved a section of the Civil Rights Act that exempted religious
organizations from Title VII's prohibition against employment discrimina-
tion based upon religious beliefs.77 Addressing the first factor, the Amos
Court stated this factor mainly prevents action with intent to promote a par-
ticular point of view on religious matters.78 "[I]t is a permissible legislative
purpose to alleviate significant governmental interference with the ability of
religious organizations to define and carry out their religious missions. 79
The Court stated that, without the exemption, religious organizations would
be significantly burdened trying to predict which activities courts would
73. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
74. Id. at 612 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
75. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
76. Amos, 483 U.S. at 334 (quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla.,
480 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1987)).
77. Id. at 329.
78. Id. at 335.
79. Id.
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deem religious.8° They would have to make these predictions under penalty
of substantial liability if they were proved wrong in court.8' "Fear of poten-
tial liability might affect the way an organization carred out what it under-
stood to be its religious mission."82
Addressing the second Lemon factor, the Court stated that laws are not
rendered unconstitutional solely for the fact that they allow religious organi-
zations to better advance their purposes.83 The Court observed that religious
organizations were better able to advance their purposes after passage of
many laws that were held constitutional.84 "For a law to have forbidden 'ef-
fects' under Lemon, it must be fair to say that the government itself has ad-
vanced religion through its own activities and influence. '85 The key analysis
is whether a clear advancement of religion exists that can be attributed to the
government.86 The Court directly stated that statutes are not per se invalid
simply because they give special consideration to religious organizations.87
"Where, as here, government acts with the proper purpose of lifting a regu-
lation that burdens the exercise of religion, we see no reason to require that
the exemption comes packaged with benefits to secular entities. '88 Finally,
regarding the third Lemon factor, the Court found "the statute effectuates a
more complete separation of [church and state] and avoids the kind of intru-
sive inquiry into religious belief that the District Court engaged in in this
case." 89 After considering the Lemon test in its methodical approach, the
Court held the exemption for religious organizations was constitutional. 9°
The Court took a more categorical approach in Texas Monthly. There
the Court reached the opposite conclusion regarding a state sales tax exemp-
tion for religious periodicals.9' In a plurality opinion, the Court struck down
the law as violative of the Establishment Clause. 2 Rather than methodically
reviewing the Lemon test, the Court made a key distinction between a liabil-
ity exemption (as was the case in Amos) and a tax exemption, stating that
"[e]very tax exemption constitutes a subsidy that affects nonqualifying tax-
payers, forcing them to become 'indirect and vicarious donors.' ' ' 93 The
80. Id. at 336.
81. Id.
82. Amos, 483 U.S. at 336.
83. Id. at 337.
84. Id. at 336.
85. Id. at 337 (emphasis in original).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 338.
88. Amos, 483 U.S. at 338.
89. Id. at 339.
90. Id. at 340.
91. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 5 (1989).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 14 (citing Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983)).
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Court was concerned with these types of religious subsidies that either bur-
den nonbeneficiaries or do not remove a state-imposed deterrent to the free
exercise of religion.94 Under these circumstances, the subsidy "'provide[s]
unjustifiable awards of assistance to religious organizations' and cannot but
'conve[y] a message of endorsement' to slighted members of the communi-
ty."
95
A major concern was the fact that the exemption itself created state en-
tanglement with religion: "Not only does the exemption seem a blatant en-
dorsement of religion, but it appears, on its face, to produce greater state
entanglement with religion than the denial of an exemption."96 The Court
went on to state that an "'overriding interest in keeping the government-
whether it be the legislature or the courts-out of the business of evaluating
the relative merits of differing religious claims. The risk that governmental
approval of some and disapproval of others will be perceived as favoring
one religion over another is an important risk the Establishment Clause was
designed to preclude.' "97
The religious services exemption, as it currently exists and in expanded
form as proposed in Section I, substantively aligns with the allowed exemp-
tion in Amos. The religious services exemption does not require taxpayers to
subsidize religious organizations, as was the case in Texas Monthly. As will
be discussed more thoroughly in Section III, there is no litigation history of
infringement claims for uses made during religious services only. What few
cases do exist have all involved uses that occurred outside of religious ser-
vices. Copyright owners are not burdened by the exemption, for it exempts
a use that has not been attacked by copyright owners, much less prohibited
by courts. Also to be discussed more thoroughly in Section III, the exemp-
tion removes two evils the Court warned about in Amos and Texas Monthly.
First, without the exemption, religious organizations would be significantly
burdened trying to predict (under penalty of substantial liability) which uses
would be fair use. This burden could be seen as a significant state-imposed
burden to use by religious organizations. Second, by relying solely on the
fair use test instead of an exemption, it is all but certain that courts will ap-
prove some uses by some religious organizations but disapprove similar
uses by other religious organizations. This could be seen as the government
favoring some religious organizations over other religious organizations.
94. Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 15.
95. Id. (quoting Amos, 483 U.S. at 348).
96. Id. at 20.
97. Id. (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring)).
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B. The Religious Services Exemption Would Not Violate the Establish-
ment Clause if Expanded to Include Secular Uses
The Texas Monthly Court issued a profound holding when it said, "If
the State chose to subsidize... all groups that contributed to the communi-
ty's cultural, intellectual, and moral betterment, then the exemption for reli-
gious publications could be retained, provided that the exemption swept as
widely as the property tax exemption upheld in Walz.' '98 This view was
adopted by the Eighth Circuit in McCarthy v. Ozark School District.99 The
state law at issue in that case required children to receive various immuniza-
tions before attending school, but the law provided an exemption if the im-
munization conflicted with the beliefs of "'a recognized church or religious
denomination."'100 This appeal was a consolidation of four district court
cases; in each case, the district courts held the exemption violated the Estab-
lishment Clause.' While the appeals were pending, the state legislature
changed the law by omitting the word "recognized" and expanding the ex-
emption to include religious or philosophical beliefs. °2 By expanding the
exemption to cover philosophical beliefs, the claims on appeal were ren-
dered moot.0 3
If the religious services exemption is deemed to run afoul of the Estab-
lishment Clause, the exemption could be saved by further expanding it to
cover other non-religious activities. Suppose the exemption was expanded
to include all regularly scheduled meetings of all teaching organizations,
both of religious and secular nature. Following the analyses in Amos and
McCarthy, this simple expansion would alleviate any constitutional prob-
lems with the Establishment Clause. For this reason, it is highly unlikely
copyright owners would ever raise an Establishment Clause challenge. In-
stead, an Establishment Clause challenge would most likely come from oth-
er organizations seeking to expand the religious services exemption to cover
the activities of their respective organizations.
It is doubtful that this type of expansion will ever be necessary for the
religious services exemption. As will be discussed in the next section, the
fair use test produces greater state entanglement with religion than the reli-
gious services exemption. Consequently, the religious services exemption
would likely survive a challenge under the Establishment Clause.
98. Id. at 15-16.
99. 359 F.3d 1029 (8th Cir. 2004).
100. Id. at n.2; ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-702(a), (d)(2) (West 2011).
101. McCarthy, 359 F.3d at 1031-32.
102. Id. at 1034; ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-702(d)(4)(A).
103. McCarthy, 359 F.3d at 1036.
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lV. THE FAIR USE TEST PRODUCES GREATER STATE ENTANGLEMENT WITH
RELIGION THAN THE RELIGIOUS SERVICES EXEMPTION
Fair use of a copyright is not copyright infringement," although delin-
eating the bounds of fair use is more art than science. Fair use is meant to
encompass "purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research."' 5
To determine if a use is a fair use, the court's review should include analysis
of four factors: "(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of
the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work."'" While courts typically limit their review to these four factors, it is
not an exhaustive list, and courts should consider any factors that would be
helpful in the analysis.'°7 Not surprisingly, the fair use analysis leads to
wildly varying results."0 8 Even comparable cases yield opposite conclu-
sions-using forty-one seconds of a Muhammad Ali boxing match in a
movie about Ali is fair use,'09 while using seventy-five seconds of a seventy-
two minute Charlie Chaplin film in a television news program is not fair
use."
0
From a pedagogical standpoint, the fair use test is a flexible test that
can accommodate a variety of uses. From a practical standpoint, the fair use
test imposes significant costs and yields unpredictable results."' As seems to
be a common thread of modern litigation, asserting fair use rights is expen-
sive." 2 In fact, the cost of asserting fair use rights is so high that religious
104. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
105. Id.
106. Id. Fair use is now codified in the Copyright Act, but it developed as a device of
common law in the nineteenth century. See Jamar, supra note 58, at 1894-95; Folsom v.
Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344-45, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
107. 17 U.S.C. § 107; Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use
Opinions, 1978-2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 563-64 (2008); Ned Snow, Proving Fair Use:
Burden of Proof as Burden of Speech, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1781, 1786-87 (2010).
108. E.g., Beebe, supra note 107, at 577-78 (providing tabular representations of the
results of fair use cases at various stages of litigation).
109. Monster Commc'ns, Inc. v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 490 (S.D.N.Y.
1996).
110. Roy Export Co. Establishment of Vaduz v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 672 F.2d
1095 (2d Cir. 1982).
111. Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV.
1483, 1496 (2007) ("[S]cholars generally agree that it is now virtually impossible to predict
the outcome of fair use cases.").
112. Cotter, Accommodating, supra note 70, at 61; Alex Kozinski & Christopher New-
man, What's So Fair About Fair Use?, 46 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S. 513, 515 (1999); Gideon
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organizations will often be chilled from exercising their fair use rights." 3
Along with the expense of asserting these rights, the vague fair use analysis
causes uncertainty when attempting to predict if a use is fair or not."' The
high costs and unpredictability of fair use fights lead to overdeterrence, as
users err on the side of caution and avoid asserting optimal fair use rights so
as to protect themselves from substantial liability."'
Aside from a handful of cases involving materials of the Church of
Scientology," 6 only five cases have substantively addressed fair use by reli-
gious organizations." 7 Four of these cases involved a religious organization
disseminating the religious material of another religious organization. For
ease of reference, I will refer to these cases as the same intrinsic purpose
(SIP) cases. The remaining case, Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority,
Inc., involved the use of a secular work by a religious organization. None of
these cases evaluated the fair use of any type of work where the use was
restricted to a formal religious service." 8 The fair use defense was unsuc-
cessful in the SIP cases" 9 but was successful in Hustler Magazine. 2° The
manner in which the courts reached their conclusions will be particularly
important for evaluating the constitutionality of the religious services ex-
emption.
Before analyzing these cases, it is important to observe that no cases
exist where a religious organization was sued for use of a copyrighted work
that was restricted to religious services. It is widely known that religious
Parchomovsky & Philip J. Weiser, Beyond Fair Use, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 91, 100-01 (2010);
Xiyin Tang, That Old Thing, Copyright... : Reconciling the Postmodern Paradox in the New
DigitalAge, 39 AIPLA Q.J. 71, 86 (2011).
113. Cotter, Accommodating, supra note 70, at 61.
114. Parchomovsky and Weiser, supra note 112, at 100; Jamar, supra note 58, at 1896-
97.
115. Parchomovsky and Weiser, supra note 112, at 100-01; Jamar, supra note 58, at
1896-97; Snow, supra note 107, at 1784-85.
116. New Era Publ'ns Int'l, ApS v. Carol Publ'g Grp., 904 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1990).
117. Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir.
2000); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1986); Soc'y
of the Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v. Archbishop Gregory of Denver, Colo., 685 F.
Supp. 2d 217 (D. Mass. 2010); Penguin Books U.S.A. Inc. v. New Christian Church of Full
Endeavor Ltd., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1680 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Bridge Publ'ns, Inc. v. Vien, 827 F.
Supp. 629 (S.D. Cal. 1993). Four other cases have addressed the issue briefly, finding a lack
of fair use without meaningful discussion. See Merkos L'Inyonei Chinuch, Inc. v. Otsar Sifrei
Lubavitch, Inc., 312 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2002); Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962);
Merkos L'Inyonei Chinuch, Inc. v. John Doe Nos. 1-25, 172 F.Supp.2d 383 (E.D.N.Y. 2001);
F.E.L. Publ'ns, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 754 F.2d 216 (7th Cir. 1985).
118. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
119. Id. It should be noted that the Penguin Books decision was later reversed when, after
trial, the district court concluded that the copyright was void. Penguin Books, No. 96 Civ.
4126 (RWS), 2004 WL 906301 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
120. See Hustler Magazine, Inc., 796 F.2d at 1148.
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organizations use copyrighted works in their services, and it is safe to pre-
sume that license fees are not paid for all such uses. This lack of prior litiga-
tion is evidence that copyright owners do not object to use made during
formal religious services only.121 In the following sections, I will attempt to
predict how courts would evaluate the fair use analysis for use restricted to
the formal religious service, considering use of both religious works and
secular works. This approach has been missing from academic endeavors. 1
22
A. Purpose and Character of Use
The main goal of this factor is to analyze whether the use is trans-
formative from the original work. 123 The use is transformative when it fur-
thers a different purpose or character or alters the original work with new
expression. 12 While the Court said "transformative use is not absolutely
necessary for a finding of fair use,"'15 recent copyright case law indicates
that the transformative use analysis has become the touchstone inquiry re-
garding the first fair use factor.126 The commercial or nonprofit purpose of
the use is not dispositive. 127 "The crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is
not whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but whether the user
stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying
the customary price."'
' 28
Each of the SIP cases decided this factor against fair use. In all four
cases, the defendant's use served the same intrinsic purpose as the original
work. 129 Only one defendant made a direct profit from the use. 3 ° In both
Society of the Holy Transfiguration and Penguin Books, the courts were not
swayed that the defendants gave away the works for free and instead fo-
121. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Cities Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 443-47 (1984).
122. See Cotter, Accommodating, supra note 70, at 52-58; Cotter, Gutenberg's Legacy,
supra note 70, at 388-91. While Professor Cotter has opined that most religious uses would
not qualify as fair use, his analysis was limited to cases where two religious organizations
competed over one religious work.
123. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578-79 (1994).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 579.
126. Parchomovsky & Weiser, supra note 112, at 100.
127. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584.
128. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985).
129. Soc'y of the Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v. Archbishop Gregory of Den-
ver, Colo., 685 F. Supp. 2d 217, 226 (D. Mass. 2010); Worldwide Church of God v. Phila.
Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1117 (9th Cir. 2000); Bridge Publ'ns, Inc. v. Vien, 827
F. Supp. 629, 635 (S.D. Cal. 1993); Penguin Books U.S.A. Inc. v. New Christian Church of
Full Endeavor Ltd., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1680, 1695 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
130. Bridge Publ'ns Inc. v. Vien, 827 F. Supp. 629, 635 (S.D. Cal. 1993).
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cused on the fact that the uses were not transformative in the least. 3' The
Worldwide Church court made two important observations. First, it stated
that religion, like academia, is "'not dollar dominated."" 32 Second, the court
observed that providing the work to church members at no cost helped the
church attract new members who would donate money, which would help
the church grow. 133 The court held this was a profit that gave the church an
advantage or benefit from the use. 1
34
In Hustler Magazine, Jerry Falwell distributed copies of the work as
part of a direct financial appeal that raised nearly one million dollars.'35 The
court noted that the financial profit made the use presumptively unfair.
136
However, Falwell used the article to make a statement about pornography
rather than merely selling the copies.'37 The court stated that the commenter
may use as much of the work as is reasonably necessary to make an under-
standable comment. 138 Since the Hustler work made a personal attack
against Falwell, the public interest in allowing Falwell to rebut the attacks
served to rebut the presumption of unfairness. 139
First, there is a commercial/non-commercial aspect of this factor.
While many religious organizations are nonprofits, all religious organiza-
tions seek to promote and advance their religious beliefs. Consequently,
religious organizations will engage in activities to grow their membership,
including the direct solicitation of monetary contributions. If courts follow
the Hustler Magazine analysis, the use will always be presumptively unfair
at the outset of the fair use analysis. If courts follow the Worldwide Church
analysis, this factor will always turn against fair use. Both approaches
should be rejected because they take the most fundamental tenet of reli-
gion-promotion of the organization's religious beliefs-and use it as a
catalyst for impeding fair use (although Falwell was able to overcome the
presumptively unfair use in Hustler Magazine).
The transformative use aspect of this factor plays out differently
whether the religious organization is using a religious work or a secular
work. For secular works, the religious organization's use should always be
considered transformative in that the religious organization's use will serve
a different intrinsic purpose than that of the original. Religious leaders will
131. Soc'y of the Holy Transfiguration, 685 F. Supp. 2d at 226-27; Penguin Books, 55
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1695.
132. Worldwide Church, 227 F.3d at 1118.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1986).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1153.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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have to add commentary and criticism to communicate its religious mes-
sage, for an effective worship service cannot consist entirely of artistic ex-
pression. 140 The transformative use analysis will not be a slam dunk for reli-
gious organizations, because they will most often use the actual work with-
out any modifications. For religious works, the SIP cases establish precedent
against fair use when a religious organization makes a general use of reli-
gious works. These cases have not addressed the situation where the purpose
and character of the use was limited to a particular religious service. When
the use is restricted to a particular religious service, the purpose and charac-
ter of the use is quite different from a general use of the same work. While
the latter use permits a general advancement (and possibly profit) of the
religious organization, the former is a restricted use for the purpose of edu-
cating the religious organization's members during a limited service. It is
likely that courts would view use of a work that is restricted to a religious
service as fair use, which is again indicated by the lack of any cases where a
religious organization was sued for use that was restricted to the religious
service.
Courts should be wary of setting one standard for secular works and a
different standard for religious works, for the distinction is not always clear.
Consider for a moment Carrie Underwood's hit single Jesus Take the Wheel.
Underwood is known as a country artist rather than a Christian artist, but the
song is about letting Jesus take control of your life, which is the very basis
of the Christian faith. The song rose to number one on the country charts
and number four on the Christian charts. It won awards from both the Coun-
try Music Association and the Gospel Music Association. Should this song
be considered a secular work or a religious work? The "right" answer to
this question is irrelevant, for if courts interpret this factor in a way so that
the distinction between a secular work and a religious work is important,
then entanglement with religion is created.
B. Nature of the Copyrighted Work
The sine qua non of copyright is originality.14" ' Consequently, fictional
works that incorporate more creativity and originality are afforded greater
protection than more fact-based works. 142 All four SIP cases concluded that,
while the religious works may be deemed factual by the religion's members,
these works embody creativity and imagination so that this factor weighs
140. Wassom, supra note 30, at 156.
141. Feist Publ'ns, Inc., v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
142. Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 143-44 (2d Cir.
1998).
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against fair use.13 Although each case danced around the issue, none of the-
se courts directly stated that the religious works at issue were fictional.1"
Hustler Magazine reached the same conclusion, finding that a sexually devi-
ant article is creative and will restrict the scope of fair use.
145
This factor shows the most direct entanglement with religion of the
four fair use factors. It requires courts to comment on the factual accuracy,
or truthfulness, of religious works. While courts have delicately broached
the subject, they have essentially declared religious works to be fictional
works. By doing so, the analyses discussed above declared the religious
texts involved to be substantively false. Clearly, practitioners of these reli-
gions strongly disagree with these declarations by the courts. Because courts
have taken this position, this factor will always go against fair use, unless
the religious organization is using a secular, fact-based work.
C. Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used in Relation to the Copy-
righted Work as a Whole
The amount of copying allowed for fair use purposes depends on the
purpose and character of the use. 146 If a substantial portion of the work is
copied verbatim, it is evidence of the work's value to both the owner and the
copying party. 147 Once again, this factor weighed against fair use in all the
SIP cases. 141 In three of these cases, the defendants copied all or a substan-
tial portion of the works. 149 The outlier was Society of the Holy Transfigura-
tion, where the defendant copied only one of seventy-seven homilies, which
comprised about three pages of the 383 pages of the original work. 5° The
court acknowledged that the defendant's work did not span a large portion
of the plaintiff's work, but it did copy the one homily in its entirety.' 5' In a
143. Soc'y of the Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v. Archbishop Gregory of Den-
ver, Colo., 685 F. Supp. 2d 217, 227 (D. Mass. 2010); Worldwide Church of God v. Phila.
Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1118 (9th Cir. 2000); Bridge Publ'ns, Inc. v. Vien, 827
F. Supp. 629, 636 (S.D. Cal. 1993); Penguin Books U.S.A. Inc. v. New Christian Church of
Full Endeavor Ltd., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1680, 1695 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
144. Worldwide Church, 227 F.3d at 1118; Bridge Publ'ns, 827 F. Supp. at 636; Penguin
Books, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1695.
145. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 1986).
146. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586-87 (1994); e.g., Sony Corp.
of Am. v. Universal Cities Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449-50 (1984) (permitting copying of
entire works).
147. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 565 (1985).
148. Soc'y of the Holy Transfiguration, 685 F. Supp. 2d at 227; Worldwide Church, 227
F.3d at 1118; Bridge Publ'ns, 827 F. Supp. at 636; Penguin Books, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1695.
149. Worldwide Church, 227 F.3d at 1118; Bridge Publ'ns, 827 F. Supp. at 636; Penguin
Books, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1695.
150. Soc'y of the Holy Transfiguration, 685 F. Supp. 2d at 227.
151. Id.
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related case under the 1909 Act, the Eighth Circuit held that copying all or
most of a song would not be fair use.
152
The Hustler Magazine court had a more interesting issue on this factor,
for the court had to first decide if Hustler's article was an entire work or a
component of the magazine issue. 5 3 To do so, the court considered the rela-
tionship of the article to the magazine as a whole.'54 The court concluded
that the article represented the essence of Hustler Magazine, that the article
could stand alone rather than being an interwoven component of the maga-
zine, and that the article was not on public display like a magazine cover.'55
The court concluded the article itself was an entire work, copied in its en-
tirety by Falwell.'56 The amount of copying militated against fair use.
157
This factor should carry little, if any, weight when dealing with uses re-
stricted to religious services. Religious services have two significant con-
straints that a general use will not have-time and message. The religious
service has a limited time; an hour should serve as a sufficient proxy for
most religions. The service is also limited to a particular message being de-
livered in that day's service. These twin constraints will naturally constrict
the amount of time a religious organization can devote to using a copyright-
ed work. If this factor is afforded any significant weight, this factor will just
permit religious organizations to use longer works over shorter works. Thus,
religious organizations would be able to use works like movies or plays, but
not songs or homilies. Consequently, this factor should be neutral or carry
little weight when evaluating a use restricted to a religious service.
This factor should not vary depending on whether the work used is
secular or religious, for this factor is concerned with the amount of the work
used rather than the nature of the work. However, the cases above demon-
strate that religious organizations will more likely prove fair use by copying
all of a secular work rather than a small amount of a religious work. As a
result, the courts have effectively held that there is more freedom to copy
large amounts of secular works rather than religious works. These outcomes
are incorrect because we have a substantial public interest in allowing reli-
gious leaders to make effective commentary on our world, particularly dur-
ing religious services. Religious leaders should be afforded wide latitude to
copy as much of works as needed to make effective commentary during
religious services, no matter the secular or religious origin of the work. The
fact that any distinction between secular or religious works has arisen re-
152. Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962).
153. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1154-55 (9th Cir.
1986).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1155.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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garding the amount of the work that can be copied demonstrates state entan-
glement with religion through the fair use test.
D. Effect of the Use Upon the Potential Market for or Value of the Copy-
righted Work
The final factor is the least understood and most misapplied. 58 Under
this factor, fair use cannot materially impair the marketability of the work.'59
Courts must consider the extent of market harm caused by the defendant and
also "'whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in
by the defendant . . . would result in a substantially adverse impact on the
potential market' for the original."'' The analysis must examine harm to the
original work and to the market for derivative works. 6' Even noncommer-
cial copying may negatively affect the copyright owner's ability to reap the
full benefits of the copyright.
62
In all the SIP cases, this factor also weighed against fair use.163 Two of
the cases gave it a cursory conclusion."6 In Worldwide, the court said the
religious text at issue was used as a marketing device by the plaintiff,
165
which was the crucial point for the court since the defendant appropriated
the text for the same purpose as the plaintiff.'66 In Society of the Holy Trans-
figuration, the defendant pointed out that the plaintiff had proven no lost
sales or profits from the copied work.' 67 The court focused on the plaintiff's
expenditure of time and resources to enforce its copyright as well as Camp-
bell's emphasis on deterring injurious conduct by others. 68
The Hustler Magazine court handled this factor in a couple of steps.
First, the court noted that Falwell's dissemination occurred after the maga-
zine was off newsstands. 69 Any effect on sales of back issues would be de
158. Patry, supra note 10, § 10:145.
159. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 566-67 (1985).
160. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994) (quoting 3 Nimmer
& Nimmer, supra note 15, § 13.05[A] [4]).
161. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591.
162. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Cities Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,450(1984).
163. Soc'y of the Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v. Archbishop Gregory of Den-
ver, Colo., 685 F. Supp. 2d 217, 228 (D. Mass. 2010); Worldwide Church of God v. Phila.
Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1119-20 (9th Cir. 2000); Bridge Publ'ns, Inc. v. Vien,
827 F. Supp. 629, 636 (S.D. Cal. 1993); Penguin Books U.S.A. Inc. v. New Christian Church
of Full Endeavor Ltd., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1680, 1695-96 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
164. Bridge Publ'ns, 827 F. Supp. at 636; Penguin Books, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1695-96.
165. Worldwide Church, 227 F.3d at 1119.
166. Id. at 1120.
167. Soc'y of the Holy Transfiguration, 685 F. Supp. 2d at 228.
168. Id. at 227.
169. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 1986).
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minimis.170 This type of analysis is likely obsolete today but was a legitimate
consideration in the pre-Internet world. Second, Falwell did not actually sell
copies of the article to his supporters, and his supporters would not be the
type of consumer to purchase Hustler. 17' Consequently, Falwell's use did not
diminish the plaintiffs sales, interfere with the original's marketability, or
serve as a substitute for the original. 172 This factor weighed in favor of fair
use and overcame the presumption of unfair exploitation from Falwell's
commercial use.
173
This factor could swing depending on the distinction of the work being
used as secular or religious. For secular works, this factor should always
weigh in favor of fair use. Use of a secular work, combined with a religious
message, cannot operate as a substitute for the original work. It would cer-
tainly not displace sales or detract licensing revenues from the owner. For
religious works, this factor will be a closer call but should still generally
favor fair use. At first blush, it would seem that the religious services use
could displace sales or cause loss of licensing revenues. However, the reli-
gious service use would not displace potential sales to congregation mem-
bers. The use is limited to the service itself and can only be enjoyed by con-
gregation members when experiencing the service. It is doubtful members
would experience the service over and over, complete with all its attendant
messages and rituals, just to experience a particular copyrighted work. Addi-
tionally, unless a copyright owner had a history of receiving licensing pay-
ments from other religious organizations for religious services use, the copy-
right owner would be hard pressed to show a loss of licensing revenues from
a religious services use. Finally, as discussed above, no case has ever been
filed against religious organizations for unlicensed use of copyrighted works
during religious services.
E. The Fair Use Analysis Produces a Greater State Entanglement with
Religion Than the Religious Services Exemption
After reviewing the fair use factors and how they have been applied in
cases involving religious organizations, it is clear that analysis of the indi-
vidual fair use factors causes unnecessary entanglement with religion. Each
of the factors, some more than others, show entanglement with religion for
courts to perform their analyses. Courts simply cannot perform the fair use
analysis without making subjective evaluations of religion that go to the
very heart of our right to religious practice. Professor Cotter was previously
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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skeptical of this conclusion, but he assumed that most uses falling under the
exemption would fail the fair use test. 174 It should be noted that Professor
Cotter analyzed cases where religious organizations made use that was not
restricted to religious services.17 The lack of any record of attempted en-
forcement by copyright owners, coupled with the analysis in this section,
demonstrates that use restricted to religious services is presumptively fair
use.
Moreover, the end result of various fair use analyses will lead to dis-
parate results, which fosters unnecessary entanglement with religion. The
likelihood of disparate results is already evident from the small body of
available case law. It is fair use for Jerry Falwell's religious organization to
make seven hundred thousand copies of a copyrighted work and directly use
these copies to raise nearly one million dollars,'76 while it is infringement for
another religious organization to distribute free copies of a fundamental
religious text to its members.'77 A secular author writing a biography may
quote large portions of a religious work for profit,'78 but a religious author
cannot reproduce 0.8% of a work for free on the Internet. 79 It is infringe-
ment to publish a small amount of an unpublished secular work,88 but it is
fair use for to publish a large amount of unpublished religious works. 8'
Even if all these results are generally accepted as correct, they could be
viewed as the courts favoring certain religious groups over other religious
groups, just as the Texas Monthly court warned.'82 This is the type of entan-
glement with religion that must be avoided.
Additionally, the United States is dominated by small religious organi-
zations that cannot afford to search and purchase multiple licenses or to liti-
gate fair use claims. 183 Because the expense of asserting fair use rights is
often enormous, most religious organizations are placed at a significant dis-
advantage to assert fair use rights. Larger religious organizations will be
better equipped to assert the same fair use rights, which would show favorit-
ism to large religious organizations over small religious organizations.
174. Cotter, Accommodating, supra note 70, at 65.
175. Id.
176. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1148 (9th Cir. 1986).
177. Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1110 (9th
Cir. 2000).
178. New Era Publ'ns Int'l, ApS v. Carol Publ'g Grp., 904 F.2d 152, 152 (2d Cir. 1990).
179. Soc'y of the Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v. Archbishop Gregory of Den-
ver, Colo., 685 F. Supp. 2d 217, 217 (D. Mass. 2010)
180. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 539 (1985).
181. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. F.A.C.T.NET, Inc., 901 F. Supp. 1519, 1527 (D. Colo.
1995).
182. Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 20 (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2
(1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
183. Wassom, supra note 30, at 180.
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After careful consideration how the fair use test would apply to use of
copyrighted works during religious services, it is certain that the fair use test
would produce greater state entanglement with religion than the religious
services exemption. The fair use test also imposes the significant risk that
the government can be seen as favoring some religious organizations over
others. The religious services exemption, either as it currently stands or in
its expanded state as suggested in this article, would survive an Establish-
ment Clause challenge. Even if a concern remained regarding the Estab-
lishment Clause, that concern could be alleviated by further expanding the
religious services exemption to encompass other forms of secular teaching.
V. CONCLUSION
Since its inception, the United States has protected religious practice
and speech. While the government avoids entanglement with religion, it also
allots accommodations for religious organizations when needed. The reli-
gious services exemption under the Copyright Act is one such accommoda-
tion. However, our society is now heavily influenced by pop culture and
governed by a system of instant access to communication. These forces have
changed the way in which religious organizations need to effectively com-
municate their religious messages. The current religious services exemption
is inadequate to meet these needs. The expansion of the religious services
exemption proposed in this article will satisfy these needs and pass constitu-
tional muster under the Establishment Clause. More importantly, the expan-
sion proposed here is supported by social norms and merely codifies the
actions of copyright owners and religious organizations that have been in
effect for decades. It is best to expand the exemption now, lest religious
services become the next battleground of copyright infringement.
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